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STATPMENT OF FACTS 
On or about June 14, 1968, plaintiff was em-
ployt·d by defendant at its Ogden plant. His employ-
ment included, among other things, the operation 
of a machine which processed hides. This machine 
and other equipment issued to plaintiff was needlessly 
unsafe, and defendant knew it but insisted that the 
equipment be used. While working with this equipment, 
and as a result of its unsafe condition, plaintiff's 
hand was pulled into the gears of the machine, and his 
left thumb was severed at the first joint. This 
occurred on the date above stated. Although plaintiff 
personally made demand for some compensation for this in-
jury, defendant gave none. Plaintiff was, of course, 
treated for the injury, lost time from work, and 
ultimately lost his job as a result of this injury, 
thus sustaining both special and general damages. 
On January 26, 1963, the Industrial Conmi11ion 
of Utah issued a certificate certifying that Beatrice 
Foods Company was qualified as a sdf-insured as of 
February 28, 1963. From that time until well after 
this suit was brough Beatrice Foods never, at any 
time, filed with the Industrial Commission any 
proof indicating its financial ability to pay direct 
compensation as required by section 35-1-46, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. The only document which might 
be considered such a statement was a request for in-
clusion of Utah By-Products with Beatrice Foods as 
a self-insured, this being accomplished in February, 
1966, over two years prior to plaintiff's injury. 
Defendant did continue to pay to the Tax Connission 
its premium tax. 
Finally, the Industrial Commission, by af-
fidavit, has sworn that it did not enforce the 
requirement that companys who expected to qualify 
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as self-insurers file annual statements of f inan-
cial ability to pay direct compensation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TIIE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUIX;MENT BECAUSE THE STATUS OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWS CLEARLY THAT DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO 
COMPLY WITH 8 35-1-46, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 
AS AMENDED. 
In his complaint plaintiff has made it clear 
that he is relying on 8 35-1-57 UCA, 1953, as 
amended, in bringing this action. That section reads, : 
in part, as follows: 
"Employers who shall fail to comply with 
the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not 
be entitled to the benefits of this title during 
the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable 
in a civil action to their employees for damages 
suffered by reason of personal injuries arising 
out of or in the course of employment caused 
by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the 
employer or any of the employer's officers, agenta 
or employees, and also to the dependents or per-
sonal representatives of such employees where 
death results from such injuries." 
As the quotation indicates, the standard for 
determining whether the section applies is compliance 
With I 35-1-46. (Ibid). It should be noted that I 
35-1-57 (Ibid) does not set as its standard "substantial 
compliance with the Worlanan•s Compensation Act," but ·' 
rather uses one section of that act as its standard. 
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What does section 35-1-46 require of an. 
employer who seeks to obtain the protection of the 
Workman's Compensation Act by being a self-insurer? 
It states: 
"Employers •••••••• shall secure compensation to 
their employees •••••••••••• 
(3) By furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay 
direct compensation in the amount, in the manner 
and when due as provided for in this title. (Emphasis 
added) I 35-1-46 UCA, 1953." 
Plaintiff's argument is based on the.rules of 
statutory construction. We maintain that the Court 
below was bound by the statute, and in applying the 
statute the Court was bound by basic rule of statutory 
construction, namely that a statute is open to con-
struction only where the language of the statute 
is ambiguous or is capable of two or more constructions. 
(See F. Salt Lake Union Stock Yards vs. State 
Copgnission 93 Utah 166. 71 P 2d 538. l9J7i and 
S rin Can on Coal Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 
4 Utah 103 277 P 206 1929. These cases are cited 
only as they bear on the rule of statutory construc-
tion stated. Neither case was involved with an 
interpretation of the statute herein involved.) 
The language of the Sections in issue is clear, 
and lead inexorably along this logical path: 
a. Employees have a civil action against. 
their employers for damage• negligently caused them 
during employment whenever said employer fails to 
comply with 35-1-46. 
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b. An employer complies with section 35-1-46 
in only three ways -
1. By obtaining insurance through the 
State Insurance Fund. 
2. By insuring with a co~petent com-
pany, or 
3. By furnishing annually to the com-
mission proof of financial ability to 
pay direct compensation. 
We submit that these are the only ways to comply 
with 35-1-46. And it is undisputed that defendant 
in this case did not insure with the State Insurance 
Fund or by other competent insurer. The only re-
maining method of compliance is "furnishing annually 
to the commission" proof of ability to pay. Here 
again, we submit, there is no dispute. Plaintiff's 
affidavit from Virginia Leahy, says, unequivocally, 
"that for the year 1968 neither Beatrice 
Foods Company nor Utah By-Products has 
furnished to the Industrial Commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability 
to pay direct compensation ••••••••• " 
Defendant's exhibits do not contradict this. Indeed 
they make it clear that the only showing made by 
defendant to the Industrial Commission which might 
be considered proof of financial ability occurred 
over two years before plaintiff was injured. Thus, 
we submit, failed to comply with 35-1-46 and plaintiff 
1s thus entitled to the remedies of 35-1-57. 
Defendant contend• that it is entitled to the 
protection of the Workman's Compensation Act because 
o~ three circumstances. 
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section itself empowers the Industrin.l Commission, 
" ••••••• to maintain a suit in any Court 
to enjoin any employer withi 11 tli(' provisions 
of this act, from further o;c·rctti .. in ,,f Lhc· 
employers business, where ti ' cmp Loyer has 
failed to insure or keep insured in u1 1 c of 
the three ways in this scctio~ provided, the 
payment of compc nsation t. J :red employees 
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that the clear intent of 35-1-57 is especially 
directed at the instant case. For, if the Industrial 
Connnission uses to the full its enforcement powers, 
then one of two results must obt~in. Either the 
employer complies, and thus 35-1-57 becomes un-
necessary as to him. Or he ceases to do business, in 
which event he will have no employees .to enforce 
section 35-1-57, or even to be injured. Thus, section 
35-1-57 becomes meaningful only when the Industrial 
Commission does not use its enforcement powers, or uses 
them in only a limited way. 
At this point some general observations are 
appropriate. The Workman's Compensation Act takes 
away from the worker his connnon law r~edy for 
employer negligence leading to injury. It replaces 
this connnon law remedy and its problems of proof with 
a remedy intended to be certain. In exchange for 
certainty, the worker gives up an opportunity to recover 
large sums from industrial injuries, and the company, in 
exchange for providing certainty of compensation, 
undertakes a liability both determinate and limited. 
(CF 58 Am Jur "Workmen's Compensation" § 2). 
If Workman's Compensation ceases to be certain, 
then the employee loses all advantage. Thus a pro-
vision, like section 35-1-57, restores to the worker 
what he has given up, namely his connnon law remedy, 
whenever the certainty of his recovery under Workman's 
Compensation is jeopardized. It is to assure this 
certainty that insurance, or adequate proof of ability 
to pay, is required. 
With this in mind, it would be foolish to 
contend that when the Industrial Commission fails 
to enforce the legislative standards set up 
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to assure certainty of payment, it also takes 
from the employees his protection against both 
company and conunission, namely his conunon law remedy. 
THIRD. Defendant contends that because 
he has paid his premium tax as required by section 
35-1-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, ~e has complied 
with section 35-1-46 (Ibid). To this plaintiff 
responds that it is a ii'Oii="sequitor to say that by 
paying money to the Tax Cormnission an employer 
satisfies his obligation to give info~ation to the 
Industrial Cormnission. The reasons for the two 
requirements are substantially different. One's 
ability to pay a premium tax does not necessarily 
guarantee his ability to pay compensation benefits. 
Finally, defendant might argue that the word 
"annually" in section 35-1-46, sub-section 3, is not 
essential. To this, plaintiff responds that as 
originally written, this section did not require a self-
insurer to submit annual ,reports. But in 1921, 
this section was amended by the legislature to insert 
the word "annually". (CF-Statutory history in notes 
following § 35-1-46, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended). Under the rules of statutory construc-
tion, then, 
" ••••••• the presumption is that every 
amendment of a statute is made to affect 
some purpose, and effect must be given the 
amended law in a manner consistent with 
the amendment." (50 Am Jur "Statutes" 8 275). 
As we have pointed out, certainty of payment is of 
the essence of Workmen's Compensation, and the legis .. 
lature sets· standards for insuring that certainty. 
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The clear and unequivocal meaning of the amendment is 
that certainty of payment by self-insureds can be 
controlled better by an annual reporting than by a 
once-in-a-lifetime filing. 
It is another rule of statutory construction 
that meaning must be given to each and every word of 
statute. If defendant, here, is found to have complied 
with section 35-1-46, then the wora "annually" will 
henceforth have no meaning. 
We submit, then, that the Court below erred in 
granting defendant's motion for surranary judgment, 
for defendant had failed to comply with section 35-1-46, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and, therefore, plaintiff 
has a cause of action under § 35-1-57, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE CERTAIN OF DEFENDANT'S DEFENSES. 
If plaintiff has a cause of action it arises as . 
a result of section 35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated 1953. · 
This, of course, is the subject matter of Point I above. 
If the Court finds for plaintiff on Point I, then it 
must follow that defendant•s First, Third, Fourth, and 
Fifth defenses fail. . 
Defense numbers One and Three will fail directly 
as a result of a finding for plaintiff in Point I 
above. Defenses Four and Five will fail because 
they are specifically denied defendant under section 
35-1-57, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
We ~ubmit this argument as self-explanitory 
Respe~ctf~ully~ subm. t .d · .:.· 
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